Organizational Impacts of ERP Projects in Market-Leading Companies

Market leadership can be the single biggest obstacle to an ERP project. That sounds counterintuitive: budget is available, executive support exists, institutional memory is deep. Yet the pattern I keep encountering on the ground tells the opposite story. A market-leading position quietly cultivates a ‘we already do this right’ culture across the organization — and that culture pushes teams to bend the ERP system toward existing habits rather than letting the system redefine those habits. The result: a project absorbing millions of Turkish lira ends up digitizing old dysfunctions in a new interface, producing nothing of strategic value. The real question is whether the core problem is technical or organizational. Every project manager who answers this incorrectly will also deliver the wrong promise to the client.Two opposing camps dominate ERP discussions. The first argues that ERP is a tool: define your processes clearly, configure correctly, and the rest runs itself. The second insists that ERP is not a technical installation but an act of organizational self-redefinition — skip the redefinition and the software generates noise at speed. Both are partially right. The first camp tends to win in practice because its approach looks faster and carries less visible short-term risk. The second describes the actual condition for real value creation but demands time and manages through resistance. The tension sits between a project expected to deliver quickly and a goal that genuinely changes how people work. That gap widens in market-leading companies because their managers have grown up watching the existing system produce good results — their confidence in the status quo is structural, not superficial.Consider a representative scenario: an automotive spare parts distributor based in Ankara, with roughly 284 employees, holding a dominant regional position. I am describing a composite pattern observed across similar engagements rather than a single named client. The company has a dense dealer network and a product range three times wider than its nearest competitor. When the ERP decision was made, the general manager framed it this way: ‘We are already running well — let’s just fix the reporting.’ That sentence forecasts the project’s failure before a single module is configured. Because ‘fix the reporting’ means keeping procurement, inventory and accounting processes exactly as they are while adding a display layer on top. ERP generates value by integrating those processes; integration requires redefining them. Without redefinition, the integration stays shallow and the reports continue feeding on inconsistent data.Organizational resistance has a precise operational shape. At every point where ERP’s data-entry standards differ from established practice, the person responsible for that point either finds a workaround to preserve the old routine or lobbies upward against the change. In the Ankara scenario, the procurement team delayed moving its order management process — which it had managed for years through its own Excel workbooks — into the ERP inventory module for six weeks through active obstruction. The team leader cited technical difficulty; the real motive was not wanting to lose the private visibility those spreadsheets provided. The aggregate cost of this kind of resistance is significant. A standard ERP deployment for a mid-scale distributor in Turkey typically completes between 8 and 14 months. When organizational resistance is left unmanaged, the timeline does not extend linearly — it lurches. The consulting firm continues billing daily, internal motivation erodes, and the project sponsor slowly withdraws. The numbers rarely lie: in the Ankara case, approximately 57 percent of consulting fees during the first eight months went toward process discovery — understanding who does what and how — rather than configuration and testing. A three-month internal process documentation exercise conducted before the project launch would have avoided most of that cost.Which approach is valid under which conditions? In companies with high market standing but low process maturity — organizations where things have run well enough that nobody ever wrote the processes down — ERP deployment must begin with process definition. This is not a preliminary exercise sitting outside the project; it is the project itself. If the project manager skips this phase with a ‘we already know our processes’ assumption, the same questions will resurface several months later at consulting rates. Conversely, in companies with documented and genuinely practiced process maturity — for example, a manufacturer that earned ISO 9001 certification through real application rather than paperwork compliance — ERP deployment proceeds with significantly less organizational trauma. The decision that determines project duration, cost and probability of success is not ‘which software should we buy’ but rather ‘how precisely have we defined our current processes and how many people actually know those definitions.’There is a scenario where this advice does not apply: emergency ERP adoptions driven by external pressure. Some companies are pushed into rapid ERP implementation as a condition of bank financing or to appear institutionally credible during a partnership negotiation. In those cases, the luxury of process maturation does not exist. Core finance and inventory modules go live first; organizational transformation is deferred to a second phase. In Turkey’s SME landscape this scenario is more common than one might expect — dollar-denominated software licensing and consulting fees make phased implementation economically rational as much as organizationally sensible. But even here a note must be entered into the record: deferring the second phase is a postponement, not a cancellation. The moment leadership declares ‘the system is live, we are done,’ the organizational transformation file closes permanently and the ERP becomes an expensive data-entry terminal.What should a general manager of a market-leading company actually do? Before committing to the project, ask your management team one question: ‘Which of our processes can we describe precisely right now, and who has the authority to approve that description?’ If the answers are vague or contested, delay the software purchase by a quarter and invest that time in process documentation. The standard objection to this suggestion is ‘we will lose time.’ The evidence points in the opposite direction: companies that complete this preparation consistently deploy ERP faster and with lower consulting dependency than those that skip it. Market leadership keeps you ahead of competitors. But that same leadership can harden into the justification for resisting change. The executive who keeps those two things clearly separated is the one who extracts genuine value from the ERP investment — not by deploying software, but by using the deployment as the moment the organization finally decides to describe itself with precision.

This article was originally published in Turkish by Gökhan MERCANOĞLU on January 23, 2010. The English edition has been reviewed and edited by the author.


The first gain in business unit ownership investments is usually visibility. The company starts to see where it slows down, which information is missing, and which decisions are delayed. This visibility may be uncomfortable, but it is the strongest starting point for sustainable improvement.


Gökhan Mercanoğlu
ERP ve Kurumsal Yazılım